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ACCULTURATION AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF DEATH PENALTY DOCTRINE IN THE
UNITED STATES
KRISTA L. PATTERSON
INTRODUCTION
Capital punishment predates the modern nation-state. Until the
twentieth century, the death penalty was administered by
extraordinarily harsh and brutal means, such as burning at the stake,
skinning alive, and crucifixion.1 Today in the United States, more
humane means such as lethal injection and electrocution are used to
carry out the death penalty. Just as the means of administering the
death penalty have evolved over time, so have attitudes toward
capital punishment in general. In the past century, the United States
Supreme Court has revised death penalty doctrine, showing concern
with when and to whom it is applied and with how it is carried out.
Although it is not surprising that the doctrine has evolved over time,
considering that it is founded on a flexible standard found in the
Eighth Amendment to the Constitution,2 what is surprising is that the
Supreme Court’s death penalty jurisprudence has demonstrated an
overall trend restricting the power of the state in favor of the human
rights of accused individuals. Even more surprising is that death
penalty doctrine in the United States has almost uniformly followed
in the footsteps of death penalty developments in other Western
developed democracies.
This pattern seems too consistent to be coincidental, but how can
the fact that the United States has so closely followed Europe’s lead
be explained? The ability to influence state behavior in the field of

Copyright © 2006 by Krista L. Patterson.
1. Rudolph J. Gerber, Death Is Not Worth It, 28 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 335, 336 (1996).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth]
Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the
progress of a maturing society.”).
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human rights has traditionally been understood through a framework
3
consisting of two methods: coercion and persuasion. However, these
two methods do not seem to explain fully the changes in United
States death penalty doctrine. Coercive measures have been
infrequently applied, and the impact of direct attempts at persuading
the United States to alter its death penalty doctrine is questionable.4
Thus, it is probable that another, less obvious method of influence is
at work.
In an article entitled, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, Professors Ryan Goodman and
Derek Jinks explore the theory that international human rights are
not spread primarily by coercive or persuasive measures, but instead
5
by a method they refer to as acculturation. They state,
“[Acculturation] induces behavioral changes through pressures to
assimilate—some imposed by other actors and some imposed by the
self.”6 Acculturation helps to more fully explain the similarities
between the development of death penalty doctrine in Europe and in
the United States as it accounts for the subtle pressures that induce
the United States to conform.
This Note analyzes how the various methods of influencing state
behavior, as outlined by Goodman and Jinks, apply to changes in
United States death penalty jurisprudence. Part I provides
background on how the use of the death penalty has evolved in both
Europe and the United States, laying out relevant similarities. Part II
presents a summary of Goodman and Jinks’ modality, providing a
framework for understanding how the United States’ death penalty
doctrine has been influenced. Part III then applies this framework,
evaluating the effectiveness of coercion, persuasion, and
acculturation, each as defined by Goodman and Jinks’ modality, as
motivating factors behind the evolution of death penalty doctrine in
the United States. Part III further argues that coercion and
persuasion inadequately explain developments in American death
penalty doctrine, and that Goodman and Jinks’ idea of acculturation

3. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and
International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 625 (2004) (discussing how the “first
generation” of international human rights scholarship found that change occurred as a result of
coercion and persuasion).
4. See infra Parts III.A–III.B.
5. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 626.
6. Id.
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is necessary to a complete understanding of how death penalty
doctrine in the United States has changed. The Note concludes with
speculation on how coercion, persuasion, and particularly
acculturation may affect death penalty doctrine in the United States
in the future.
I. A SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON
A. Death Penalty Doctrine in Europe
The first attempts to abolish the death penalty in Europe
occurred at the end of the eighteenth century.7 Prior to this period,
the death penalty was widely applied in Europe by a variety of
barbaric means.8 However, the rise in humanitarian philosophy at the
end of the eighteenth century caused state leaders to reevaluate their
9
treatment of those found guilty of crimes. Leaders began to develop
more humane systems of penal law under the influence of
philosophers such as Cesare Beccaria, who criticized the death
penalty in his treatise Of Crime and Punishment.10 In this spirit,
several states called for the abolition of the death penalty during this
period, including Tuscany, Austria, and France.11
Although abolitionist sentiment was strong at the end of the
eighteenth century in Europe, it was short-lived. Soon after
provisions abolishing the death penalty were put in place, they were
reversed,12 and the French Code Civil, which served as the foundation
for codes in Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, called for

7. Roger Hood, Introduction to THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN EUROPE 9, 10
(Tanja Kleinsorge & Barbara Zatlokal eds., 1999).
8. M. MARC ANCEL, EUROPEAN COMM’N ON CRIME PROBLEMS, THE DEATH PENALTY
IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES 8 (1962).
9. Id. at 9.
10. Id.
11. Ancel notes that
Leopold II of Tuscany abolished capital punishment in the Tuscan Penal Code of
1786 . . . and Joseph II abolished it in the Austrian Code of 1787. . . . With regard to
French law, it is to be noted that the decree of the Convention of 14th Brumaire of
the Year IV provided for the abolition of capital punishment when peace should be
re-established, but it never took effect, even after the Peace of Amiens.
Id. at 9.
12. Hood, supra note 7, at 10; see also ANCEL, supra note 8, at 9 (“Austria re-introduced
the death penalty for high treason in 1795 and for other crimes as well in the Code of 1803,
while Tuscany also reverted to it in 1730.”).
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the death penalty as the punishment for a number of crimes.
Additionally, the death penalty served as the punishment for over 200
crimes in England at the turn of the nineteenth century.14
Despite the widespread use of the death penalty in the early
1800s, abolitionist movements again began to emerge around 1830.15
The changes brought about by these movements were gradual, first
consisting of declining use of the death penalty before changes in the
law occurred.16 However, by the end of the nineteenth century, a
number of European countries had adopted policies and legislation
17
against the use of capital punishment.
Further setbacks in the complete abolition of the death penalty
in Europe again occurred during the first half of the twentieth
century. The authoritarian movement caused a number of countries
to reinstate capital punishment, including Italy, Austria, and
18
Germany. Furthermore, the Second World War caused even states
with strong abolitionist sentiment to reinstate the death penalty for
19
certain war-related crimes.
Despite these temporary setbacks, the trend toward the abolition
of the death penalty in Europe continued after the end of the Second
20
World War. By 1962, only the United Kingdom, the Irish Republic,
Spain, Turkey, Greece, and France carried out executions in Europe,
and by 1977, Turkey was the only state not to have abandoned capital

13. ANCEL, supra note 8, at 9.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 10; see, e.g., Hood, supra note 7, at 10 (noting that Portugal did not abolish the
death penalty until 1863, but it had not been imposed since 1843).
17. For example, in France the list of crimes punishable by death was shortened to exclude
forgery, compound larceny, and eventually political crimes. Additionally, juries in France were
given increased discretion in applying the death penalty. ANCEL, supra note 8, at 10. In
Germany, the 1849 Constitution ineffectively attempted to abolish the death penalty in German
States. Id. In Spain, a bill to abolish the death penalty was introduced in 1822. Id. In the United
Kingdom, there was a drastic reduction in the number of offenses punishable by death in the
1861 Offences Against the Person Act. Id. In Portugal, the death penalty was completely
abolished in 1863, a step later taken by Romania, Italy, Norway, and the Netherlands. Hood,
supra note 7, at 10.
18. See ANCEL, supra note 8, at 11–12 (detailing the authoritarian movement in Italy,
Germany, and Austria, in which German law was applicable from 1938 until 1945).
19. See id. at 12 (noting that Belgium, Norway, and the Netherlands brought back the
death penalty for treason, war crimes, and collaboration with the enemy).
20. See id. at 12–13 (observing that “the movement has always been towards the abolition
of capital punishment” and in particular noting the post-war movements toward abolition in
England, Italy, Germany, and Austria).
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21

punishment. Movement in the direction of the abolition of the death
penalty could even be seen in former Soviet countries, known for
using the death penalty as a political tool, by the late 1980s.22
The trend toward abolition in individual European countries in
the latter half of the twentieth century was accompanied by the
development of regional and international human rights regimes,
many of which advocated the abolition of the death penalty. The first
major step toward an international human rights system and the
abolition of the death penalty on an international scale was the
United Nations’ adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR) in 1948.23 Article 3 of the UDHR states, “Everyone
24
has the right to life, liberty and security of person.” Although this
provision did not specifically urge the abolition of the death penalty,
the “right to life” language provided an important springboard for
future developments.
This language can be seen in the next major document in the
development of the international human rights regime: the
25
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The
ICCPR built on the UDHR by both adding detail and providing
26
binding norms. Article 6 of the ICCPR provides, “Every human
being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by
law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life.”27 Although the
ICCPR did not prohibit the use of the death penalty, except involving
those under the age of eighteen at the time of the crime, article 6 did
state, “Nothing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent
the abolition of capital punishment by any State Party to the present
Covenant.”28 The wording of article 6 thus indicated a preference for
the abolition of the death penalty.
The preference for the abolition of the death penalty in the
ICCPR was strengthened into a requirement in the subsequent

21. Hood, supra note 7, at 10.
22. Id.
23. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess.,
1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
24. Id. art. 3.
25. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. EXEC. DOC. E,
95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
26. Although the UDHR was a declaration, the ICCPR was a treaty and was thus binding
on those states that ratified it.
27. ICCPR art. 6, para. 1.
28. Id. para. 6.
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29
Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR. The Second Optional
Protocol provides, “No one within the jurisdiction of a State Party to
the present Protocol shall be executed. Each State Party shall take all
necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its
jurisdiction.”30 Although the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR
was only binding on those states that ratified it, it represented the first
statement of an emerging international norm against capital
punishment. Other recent international human rights treaties contain
provisions on capital punishment as well, such as the Convention on
the Rights of the Child (CRC).31
The development of a regional human rights system that led to
the Europe-wide abolition of the death penalty accompanied these
international developments in human rights. The first major step in
the development of a European regional human rights system was the
32
creation of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
The Council of Europe created the ECHR, which came into force on
September 3, 1953, in order to form a list of fundamental rights and
freedoms under the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights. Article 2 of the ECHR states, “Everyone’s right to life shall
be protected by law.”33 However, the ECHR did not abolish capital
punishment, but instead preserved it, stating, “No one shall be
deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of
a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty is
34
provided by law.”
The trend toward abolition in individual European states began
to influence region-wide change after a 1962 survey by Marc Ancel
for the Council of Europe illustrated the uniformity of European
35
states’ trend toward abolition. By the end of the 1970s, the
Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe had begun to

29. Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
aiming at the abolition of the death penalty, G.A. Res. 44/128, U.N. GAOR, 44th Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (Dec. 15, 1989) [hereinafter Second Optional Protocol].
30. Id. art. 1.
31. Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 48, at
166, U.N. Doc. A/Res/ 44/99 (Nov. 20, 1989) [hereinafter CRC].
32. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950 [hereinafter ECHR].
33. Id. art. 2, para. 1.
34. Id.
35. See generally ANCEL, supra note 8.
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36
consider the death penalty a human rights issue. Once the Council of
Europe established that the death penalty violated human rights, the
need for region-wide abolition became apparent, and the Committee
of Ministers decided to create a protocol to the ECHR that would
ban capital punishment in European countries.37 Thus, Protocol
Number 6 to the ECHR was drafted and entered into force on March
38
1, 1985.
Protocol Number 6 was the first Europe-wide pronouncement on
the abolition of the death penalty. Article 1 of Protocol Number 6
states, “The death penalty shall be abolished. No one shall be
39
condemned to such penalty or executed.” Thus, the protocol directly
prohibited the death penalty and did not require any action on the
40
part of the states. It is important to note, however, that although
Protocol Number 6 was a large step in the abolition of the death
penalty in Europe, it still provided states with the option of using the
death penalty during times of war.41
The next important step in the abolition of the death penalty in
Europe came when the Council of Europe decided in 1993 that
42
applicants to the Council must sign and ratify the ECHR. By 1994,
the Parliamentary Assembly strengthened this requirement, stating
that applicants to the Council must put in place an immediate
moratorium on executions followed by the signature and ratification
of Protocol Number 6 to the ECHR abolishing the death penalty in
peacetime.43 Thus, all Council of Europe members were required to
abolish the death penalty in times of peace.
Recent changes in Europe have reflected a similar emphasis on
the abolition of the death penalty. In 2002, the Council of Europe

36. Hans Christian Krüger, Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention on Human Rights,
in THE DEATH PENALTY: ABOLITION IN EUROPE, supra note 7, at 69, 70 (1999).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, Apr. 28, 1983, art. 1,
Europ. T.S. No. 114 [hereinafter Protocol No. 6].
40. Krüger, supra note 36, at 70.
41. See Protocol No. 6 art. 2 (“A State may make provision in its law for the death penalty
in respect of acts committed in time of war or of imminent threat of war; such penalty shall be
applied only in the instances laid down in the law and in accordance with its provisions. The
State shall communicate to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe the relevant
provisions of that law.”).
42. Hood, supra note 7, at 11.
43. Id.
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44
adopted Protocol Number 13 to the ECHR, which supplements
Protocol Number 6 by calling for the complete abolition of the death
penalty, even during times of war. Furthermore, in order to become a
member of the European Union (EU) a state must have abolished
capital punishment.45 Additionally, the EU has undertaken measures
to persuade other states to abolish the death penalty, including the
Guidelines to European Union Policy toward Third Countries on the
Death Penalty.46
Europe has been moving slowly toward the abolition of the death
penalty for centuries. Early periods of abolitionist sentiment were
followed by setbacks to the abolition of the death penalty, but since
the creation of international human rights regimes in the latter-half of
the twentieth century, Europe has moved rapidly toward abolition
under the premise that capital punishment violates human rights.
Although the United States has yet to reach the final step of
abolition, up to this point, the developments in American death
penalty doctrine follow a very similar path to the European
developments just described.

B. Death Penalty Doctrine in the United States
Capital punishment has occurred in the United States since
before the country’s inception. The first documented execution on
U.S. soil occurred in 1608.47 When the Constitution was written, the
Framers were aware of capital punishment, and the lack of any
explicit prohibition on capital punishment in the Constitution
indicates that they were also tolerant of it.48 The provision in the
Constitution that most closely relates to capital punishment is the
Eighth Amendment, which states, “Excessive bail shall not be
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”49 Although the Framers did not intend for the
44. Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in All Circumstances,
May 3, 2002, Europ. T.S. No. 183 [hereinafter Protocol No. 13]; see also Nora V. Demleitner,
The Death Penalty in the United States: Following the European Lead? 81 OR. L. REV. 131, 138
(2002).
45. Hood, supra note 7, at 11.
46. Guidelines to European Union Policy towards Third Countries on the Death Penalty,
June 3, 1998, available at http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/Guidelines.htm.
47. RAYMOND PATERNOSTER, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 3 (1991).
48. Id.
49. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

04__PATTERSON.DOC

2006]

10/13/2006 8:50 AM

DEATH PENALTY

1225

“cruel and unusual punishment” provision to outlaw capital
50
51
punishment, it has since been interpreted as an evolving standard,
and it is the primary source used by abolitionists to argue for the
unconstitutionality of the death penalty.
Until the 1900s, the death penalty in America was primarily
52
under local control. Initially, colonies created their own penal
systems and imposed the death penalty as they saw fit.53 The use of
the death penalty was influenced by British tradition,54 although the
death penalty was applied far less extensively in the colonies, in
55
particular those in the North, than it was applied in England. In
America, the death penalty was mostly reserved for serious crimes
such as murder and rape; however some colonies imposed capital
punishment for religious crimes and other offenses.56 Conversely, in
England the list of crimes for which the death penalty was imposed
57
grew longer and longer during this period.
The first steps toward restricting the use of the death penalty in
America occurred shortly after the United States became a nation.
The Commonwealth of Massachusetts led the way by restricting the
58
list of crimes for which death was a penalty. Other states followed
suit, limiting the number of crimes subject to the death penalty and,
59
for some states, dividing the crime of murder into degrees. Such
actions on the part of the states signaled the beginning of a gradual
shift from a locally controlled death penalty regime to one controlled

50. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 3 (“Since the Fifth Amendment ensured that no
person could be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, the implication
was that with such due process of law such deprivations were acceptable.”).
51. See Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958) (“The [Eighth] Amendment must draw its
meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society.”).
52. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 3.
53. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 6 (2002)
(“England’s North American colonies exhibited significant regional variation in their criminal
codes right from the beginning.”).
54. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5 (outlining the contemporary history of capital
punishment in England and noting its pervasive influence on the colonies).
55. See BANNER, supra note 53, at 6 (stating that property crimes in particular were treated
much more leniently in the northern colonies than in England).
56. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5.
57. BANNER, supra note 53, at 7.
58. See PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 5 (stating that capital crimes were reduced to
include only “murder, sodomy, burglary, buggery, arson, rape, and treason”).
59. Id. at 6.
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by the state, although this process was not completed until the
60
twentieth century.
The sentiment of the American people regarding the death
penalty was similarly evolving during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, and the first public discussions on whether the
death penalty should be completely abolished were initiated during
61
this period. As the debate over the death penalty continued into the
nineteenth century, abolitionists organized themselves alongside anti62
slavery and temperance groups. In 1845, the first national
organization opposing the death penalty was created: the American
Society for the Abolition of Capital Punishment.63 Popular opinion
against the death penalty accompanied the trend of state
governments restricting the death penalty to fewer crimes in fewer
circumstances.
The work of death penalty abolitionists began to come to fruition
during the middle of the nineteenth century. In 1846, Michigan
became the first state to abolish capital punishment for all crimes but
treason.64 In the next ten years, Rhode Island and Wisconsin
completely abolished the death penalty for all crimes,65 and during the
latter half of the nineteenth century, three more states, Iowa, Maine
66
and Colorado, completely abolished the death penalty. The
abolitionists were beginning to make headway, although their
progress soon slowed and became plagued by setbacks, such as Iowa’s
reinstatement of the death penalty in 1878, Maine’s temporary
reinstatement of the death penalty from 1883 through 1887, and
Colorado’s reinstatement of the death penalty in 1901.67
The trend toward abolition was revived during the progressive
68
era accompanying the turn of the twentieth century. Nine states—

60. See id. at 7 (“In the 1890s, 86 percent of all executions were performed under local
authority, but by the 1920s almost eight out of every ten executions were conducted under state
authority.”).
61. See BANNER, supra note 53, at 88 (describing the abolitionist sentiment present in
newspaper editorials, letters, and political figures’ works of the 1780s and 1790s).
62. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 8.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Rhode Island did so in 1852, Wisconsin in 1853. Id.
66. Iowa did so in 1872. Maine did so in 1876. Colorado did so in 1897. Id.
67. WILLIAM J. BOWERS, EXECUTIONS IN AMERICA 6 tbl.1-1 (1974).
68. See id. at 7 (discussing the progressive ideas prevalent at the beginning of the twentieth
century such as abolitionism, feminism, prohibition, and prison reform).
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Kansas, Minnesota, Washington, Oregon, North Dakota, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Arizona, and Missouri—did away with the death
69
penalty during this period. However, the beginning of the First
World War again produced setbacks in the abolitionist movement,
causing six of the nine states that had just abolished the death penalty
to reinstate it.70 After Kansas later reinstated the death penalty,71 only
72
six states remained abolitionist by the middle of the 1900s.
Despite the setbacks incurred thus far, the movement to abolish
the death penalty again gained strength during the latter half of the
twentieth century. Alaska and Hawaii were both abolitionist when
73
they became states in 1960, and all nine states to abolish capital
punishment in the second half of the twentieth century remain
74
abolitionist to this day, with the exception of Delaware.
Furthermore, even in states where capital punishment was legal, it
was used less and less, causing the number of executions to decline
drastically from 1930 to 1970.75
Most of the influential developments in United States death
penalty doctrine before 1970 took place in state legislatures; however
76
in 1972 the Supreme Court’s decision in Furman v. Georgia began a
period during which the most influential changes in the death penalty
have come from the federal judiciary. Since Furman, the Supreme
Court has played a significant role in moving the United States down
Europe’s path by continually restricting the constitutionality of the
death penalty.77
The Court in Furman did not go so far as to find the death
penalty to be unconstitutional; however it did find, by a 5 to 4 margin,
that the death penalty, as it was applied in Furman and two
accompanying cases, was “cruel and unusual punishment in violation
78
of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.” The practical result of

69. See id. at 6 tbl.1-1 (listing the 9 states that abolished the death penalty between the turn
of the twentieth century and World War I).
70. See id. (noting that Minnesota, North Dakota, and Kansas were the only states of the
nine above who did not reinstate the death penalty during this period).
71. See id. (showing that Kansas reinstated the death penalty in 1935).
72. Id. at 7.
73. Alaska and Hawaii repealed the death penalty as territories in 1957. Id.
74. Delaware only abolished the death penalty from 1958 to 1961. Id. at 6 tbl.1-1.
75. PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 11 fig.1-1.
76. Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
77. See infra notes 78–97 and accompanying text.
78. Furman, 408 U.S. at 240.
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Furman was to strike down all existing capital punishment statutes
because of the unguided and unregulated discretion given by these
79
statutes to criminal juries in death penalty cases. Thus, in order to
continue using the death penalty, it was necessary for states to revise
their capital punishment sentencing guidelines in conformity with
Furman. As many as thirty-five states attempted to reinstate the
80
death penalty with revised statutes. However, they were compelled
to meet further requirements delineated by the Court in later cases
such as Gregg v. Georgia,81 which held that statutes requiring the
mandatory imposition of the death penalty in certain situations were
unconstitutional, while statutes that merely guided the discretion of
jurors in death penalty cases withstood constitutional scrutiny.82
Despite the fact that many states passed new legislation to
reinstate the death penalty after the brief pause instituted by Furman,
since Furman the death penalty has been used less frequently than
ever before in the United States. Raymond Paternoster asserts,
“Since the reinstatement of capital punishment only a handful of
offenders have been executed each year.”83 The decline in the use of
the death penalty has resulted from legislative and executive action
by states, from the discretion of jurors and judges, and most
importantly, from action on the part of the Supreme Court restricting
capital punishment.
One of the means by which the Court has limited the death
penalty is by restricting the crimes for which the death penalty can be
84
a punishment. In Coker v. Georgia the Supreme Court held that
85
capital punishment could not be imposed for rape, and in Enmund v.
86
Florida the Court restricted when the death penalty could be applied
for felony murder.87 In both of these cases, the Court focused its
analysis on whether applying the death penalty for those convicted of
rape or felony murder would be consistent with the Eighth
Amendment’s evolving standard, and in both cases the Supreme

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 19.
Id. at 20.
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
Id. at 206–07; see also PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 21.
PATERNOSTER, supra note 47, at 21.
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
Id. at 598.
Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
Id. at 801.
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Court defined this standard by looking at objective factors, such as
actions of state legislatures and sentencing juries, to determine “the
88
country’s present judgment.”
The Court has also attempted to gauge national opinion in its
decisions regulating to whom the death penalty can be applied. In
Atkins v. Virginia,89 the Supreme Court held that the death penalty
could not be applied to those who are mentally retarded,90 and in
Thompson v. Oklahoma91 the Court found it cruel and unusual
punishment in contravention of the Eighth Amendment to execute
someone who was fifteen or fewer years of age at the time of the
crime.92 The reach of Thompson was limited by Stanford v.
93
Kentucky, which upheld the constitutionality of applying the death
penalty to someone who was seventeen years of age at the time of the
crime.94 However, this decision was overruled in the recent Supreme
95
Court case Roper v. Simmons. In Simmons, the Court found the
execution of those under the age of 18 at the time of the crime to be
unconstitutional under the evolving Eighth Amendment standard.96
All of these cases turned on the Court’s appraisal of “national
consensus,” as evidenced primarily by state legislative action
regarding the death penalty.97
The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court and the Court’s
appraisal of national consensus in these cases evidence an overall
trend toward restricting the death penalty in the United States. As a
result of Supreme Court decisions, those convicted of felony murder
or rape, mentally retarded individuals, and those under the age of
eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime can no longer be
executed.98 Currently, thirty-eight states still have statutes imposing
88. Coker, 433 U.S. at 593; accord Enmund, 458 U.S. at 788–89 (discussing Coker’s
approach and analyzing issue “in a similar manner”).
89. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
90. Id. at 321.
91. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
92. Id. at 838.
93. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551 (2005).
94. Id. at 380.
95. Roper, 543 U.S. 551.
96. Id. at 578.
97. See id. at 564 (“The beginning point is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as
expressed in particular by the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question. This
data gives us essential instructions.”).
98. See supra notes 84–97 and accompanying text.
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the death penalty, but only thirty-three of these states have executed
99
someone since 1976. In 2004, only fifty-nine people were executed
nation-wide and in 2005, this number was only sixty.100 These numbers
are down from the ninety-eight people executed in 1999 and the
101
eighty-five people executed in 2000. Furthermore, the number of
people sentenced to death hit a record low in 2004—65 percent fewer
102
than in 1998.
Although, just as in Europe, there have been temporary setbacks
over time, American death penalty doctrine is slowly moving toward
abolition. In particular, the jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court has almost uniformly moved in the direction of
103
abolition since 1972. In order to evaluate whether these similarities
between European and American death penalty doctrine will result in
the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the United States, it is
important to understand why the developments in Europe and the
United States have been so similar.
II. GOODMAN AND JINKS’ MODALITY
In order to understand why the United States’ death penalty
doctrine has developed largely in the footsteps of Europe’s, one must
look to how states influence one another in general. In How to
Influence States: Socialization and International Human Rights Law,
Ryan Goodman and Derek Jinks set forth a framework that attempts
to provide a comprehensive understanding of how states influence

99. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Facts About the Death Penalty 1, (May 12, 2006), http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/FactSheet.pdf (last visited June 4, 2006).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. In 2005, only 125 people were sentenced to death nationwide. American Judicature
Society, http://www.ajs.org/include/story.asp?content_id=478 (last visited June 4, 2006). In 1998
this number was approximately 300. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., supra note 99, at 3.
103. The only exception to the Supreme Court’s continual restriction of the death penalty
was Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), which was recently abrogated by Roper v.
Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). It should also be noted that federal legislation has somewhat
undermined the trend in restricting the death penalty by narrowing the scope of habeas corpus
relief in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§
104–108, 110 Stat. 1214–26 (codified as amended in scattered sections of U.S.C.). However,
changes in the scope of habeas corpus are only important to death penalty doctrine once a death
sentence has already been imposed, and it is at this initial sentencing level that the Supreme
Court’s restrictions take effect.
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104
one another, particularly in the field of human rights. Goodman and
Jinks’ modality provides a foundation for understanding the
influential factors that have shaped American death penalty doctrine.
In Goodman and Jinks’ framework, there are three mechanisms
by which states influence one another: coercion, persuasion, and
acculturation. By carefully differentiating and defining these three
mechanisms, Goodman and Jinks provide a modality for
understanding the complexities of state interaction with regard to
human rights.
For Goodman and Jinks, coercion is the “first, and most obvious,
social mechanism.”105 It entails the deliberate practice of states
providing “material rewards and punishments” to other states in
order to “escalat[e] the benefits of conformity or the costs of
nonconformity.”106 Thus, in essence coercion works by altering a
state’s cost-benefit calculations in favor of a certain result.107
Since coercion depends upon one state’s ability to alter another
state’s cost-benefit calculation, coercion necessarily implicates power
dynamics among states. Goodman and Jinks assert, “Under the
coercion approach, traditional notions of power—military and
economic—provide the principal machinery for changing state
108
practices.” States can coerce other states through the unilateral
employment of military or economic measures or threats, or they can
cooperate with other states through treaty instrumentalities,
funneling their coercive influence through international law.109 Either
way, coercion requires some level of individual or pooled military or
economic power to effectively influence state behavior.
For Goodman and Jinks, persuasion is a less forceful, but equally
deliberate mechanism of state-to-state influence. Goodman and Jinks
define persuasion as “the active, often strategic, inculcation of
norms. . . . [in which] actors are consciously convinced of the truth,
110
validity, or appropriateness of a norm, belief, or practice.” Under

104. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 625–26 (proposing that their acculturation
analysis will help provide a “more complete conceptual framework”).
105. Id. at 633.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 634.
108. Id. at 690.
109. See id. at 691 (discussing the possibilities of coercive influence through treaties, in
particular “agreements with teeth”).
110. Id. at 635.
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persuasion, both states are aware of the persuasive effort, thus one
state must use overt measures such as careful argument and reasoned
logic to assert its influence.
The obvious nature of persuasion makes the means through
which it is employed particularly important to its effectiveness.
Goodman and Jinks outline several techniques that enhance a
persuasive effort, including framing and cuing.111 Framing relates to
the substantive context in which the persuasive material is presented.
“The basic idea,” they state, “is that the persuasive appeal of a
counterattitudinal message increases if the issue is strategically
framed to resonate with already accepted norms.”112 Cuing relates to
the procedural context in which the persuasive material is presented.
Proper cuing results in a target audience “‘think[ing] harder’ about
the merits of a counterattitudinal message.”113 Both framing and cuing
attempt to render a state more open to the persuasiveness of another
state’s arguments.
Goodman and Jinks suggest that, although coercion and
persuasion were the predominant mechanisms explored in “[f]irst
114
generation scholarship” on human rights laws, they provide an
incomplete framework insofar as coercion “fails to grasp the
complexity of the social environment within which states act” and
persuasion “fails to account for many ways in which the diffusion of
115
social and legal norms occurs.” Thus, they suggest that a third
mechanism is necessary to a more complete understanding of how
states influence one another, a mechanism they term
“acculturation.”116 Acculturation is an important, but systematically
undervalued, social mechanism,117 defined as “the general process of
adopting the beliefs and behavioral patterns of the surrounding
culture,” and works not by direct means of influence, but instead by
“changing the actor’s social environment.”118 Thus, for one state to
influence another, acculturation requires a state to somehow

111. Id. at 636–37.
112. Id. at 636.
113. Id. at 637.
114. Id. at 625.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 626.
117. See id. at 700 (“[A]n integrated model should take seriously the processes of
acculturation. Indeed, acculturation has been systematically undervalued (and, at times,
misunderstood) in debates about human rights regimes.”).
118. Id. at 638.
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influence the target state’s group identifications. In the field of human
rights, Goodman and Jinks posit that influencing group identifications
may not be a complex undertaking, as they see an emerging global
119
social environment within which human rights norms can be spread.
Once a target state is firmly within the appropriate social
environment, acculturating that state to the desired norm requires
another state to apply a variety of cognitive and social pressures.
Goodman and Jinks outline two types of cognitive pressures that play
a role in acculturation: “(1) social-psychological costs of
nonconformity (such as dissonance associated with conduct that is
inconsistent with an actor’s identity or social roles), and (2) socialpsychological benefits of conforming to group norms and
expectations (such as the ‘cognitive comfort’ associated with both
120
high social status and membership in a perceived ‘in-group’).” A
state applying these cognitive pressures creates “‘[c]ognitive
dissonance’” in the target state as a result of the difference between
the pressures and the target state’s counter-attitudinal actions or
beliefs, with the aim that the target state will relieve this dissonance
by conforming to the desired norm.121
Goodman and Jinks also identify two types of social pressures
that play a role in acculturation: “(1) the imposition of socialpsychological costs through shaming or shunning and (2) the
conferral of social-psychological benefits through ‘back-patting’ and
122
other displays of public approval.” These pressures are more
obvious than cognitive pressures and play on a target state’s need for
social legitimacy and status rather than its internal sense of legitimacy
and justifiability. A combination of both cognitive and social
pressures is most likely to produce the desired result.
One final set of variables presented by Goodman and Jinks
influence the effectiveness of acculturation independently from the

119. See id. at 646–56 (discussing the extent of isomorphism across states and providing
statistical and case evidence of acculturation within a global social environment).
120. Id. at 640 (citations omitted).
121. See id. at 640–41 (“‘Cognitive dissonance’—defined broadly as the discomfort caused
by holding two or more inconsistent cognitions—is a useful example. This phenomenon is part
of a family of cognitive processes related to the basic human need to justify one’s actions to
oneself and others. . . . An implication of [internal pressure such as cognitive dissonance] is that
once actors internalize some role (or any other identity formation), they are impelled to act and
think in ways consistent with the highly legitimated purposes and attributes of that role.”)
(citations omitted).
122. Id. at 641.

04__PATTERSON.DOC

1234

10/13/2006 8:50 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:1217

acuteness of the pressures applied. These variables, derived from
123
social impact theory, are group “strength, immediacy, and size.”
Goodman and Jinks posit that: “(1) conformity with group norms
becomes more likely as the importance of the group to the target
actor increases (and as the importance of the issue to the group
increases); (2) conformity increases as the target actor’s exposure to
the group increases; and (3) conformity increases—up to a point—as
the size of the reference group increases.”124 Ultimately, these three
variables relate back to the need for a state to alter its target’s social
environment in order for acculturation to be successful. By
maximizing group importance, exposure, and size, a state ensures the
maximum scope of a target state’s immergence in the appropriate
social environment, and thus the likelihood that a target state will be
susceptible to acculturation.
For Goodman and Jinks, acculturation works in tandem with
coercion and persuasion, forming a complete modality through which
human rights norms are spread from state to state. Thus, in evaluating
the development of death penalty doctrine in the United States, the
role played by acculturation, in addition to those played by coercion
and persuasion, must be evaluated to fully explain the similarities in
United States developments to those that have occurred in Europe.
III. EVALUATING THE SIMILARITIES BETWEEN EUROPE
AND THE UNITED STATES
From the outset it is clear that the death penalty doctrines of
both Europe and the United States are on a similar trajectory. Just as
Europe underwent an extended period of gradual movement toward
abolition marked by a number of temporary setbacks before
completely abolishing the death penalty in 1985,125 the United States is
currently experiencing an overall trend toward abolition driven by
Supreme Court jurisprudence, despite the setbacks outlined above.126
Goodman and Jinks’ modality provides three potential means of
explaining the similarity in death penalty doctrine between Europe
and the United States.

123. Id. at 642.
124. Id.
125. Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR entered into force in 1985. See supra note 38 and
accompanying text.
126. See supra Parts I.A–I.B.
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First, the similarity between the death penalty doctrines of
Europe and the United States could be a result of attempts by Europe
and other states that have abolished the death penalty to coerce the
United States. Although Goodman and Jinks’ modality emphasizes
coercion as a viable means of influencing state behavior, the power
dynamics between the United States and other states make the
possibility that the United States has been coerced much less likely.
And there are no examples of successful outright coercion of the
United States in this area.127
Second, the similarity between Europe and the United States
could be a result of direct attempts by Europe to persuade the United
States. There is considerable evidence of such attempts,128 and the
acknowledgement and use of European doctrine and practice by
some members of the Court suggests that persuasion is one means of
explaining the similarity between European and American death
penalty doctrine. However, persuasion may not fully account for the
similarities between the United States and Europe. Supreme Court
Justices do not explicitly state that they are persuaded by the logic of
foreign and international sources; instead, they merely provide these
sources as examples of what other states have done.129 Indeed, some
Justices vehemently reject any use of European or other foreign
130
sources in Supreme Court opinions. These factors suggest that
persuasion is probably not the only method of influence at work.131
Finally, the method of influence that best seems to explain the
great degree of similarity between European and American death
penalty doctrine is Goodman and Jinks’ idea of acculturation.
Acculturation suggests that the United States is following in Europe’s
footsteps not only as a result of outright coercion and persuasion, but
also because the beliefs and behavior of Europe, as a part of the
culture of Western developed democracies surrounding the United
States, have more subtly influenced the beliefs and behavior of the
United States through a number of micro-processes.132 Acculturation
is necessary to a complete understanding of the similarity between the

127. See infra Part III.A.
128. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
129. See infra notes 147–57 and accompanying text.
130. See infra notes 158–62 and accompanying text.
131. See infra Part III.B.
132. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 68 (describing the micro-processes of
acculturation, which include “orthodoxy, mimicry, identification, and status-maximization”).
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United States and Europe because, although the United States has
resisted more overt forms of social pressure from Europe and other
Western states, its treatment of the death penalty shows sensitivity to
the tacit cognitive and social pressures produced by these other
133
states.
A. The Failures of Coercive Influence
Under Goodman and Jinks’ definition of coercion, it is
theoretically possible that Europe and other Western states could
provide the United States with some sort of material benefit for
abolishing the death penalty or with some sort of material cost for not
abolishing the death penalty, which could cause the United States to
find that the benefits of moving toward abolition outweigh the costs.134
However, the United States does not seem to have based its action on
a response to such a cost-benefit calculation.
Some of the only truly coercive measures that Europe and other
states have utilized against the United States regarding the death
penalty are threats not to invest in states that apply the death
135
penalty and refusal to extradite criminals to the United States
136
because of its use of the death penalty. Although European refusal
to invest would cost the United States economically and refusal to
extradite would cost the United States the ability to prosecute
accused criminals within its jurisdiction, the United States’ strong
economic and political power lessens the potential impact of these
costs. These measures seem unlikely to change the United States’
behavior. And there is no evidence that they have done so.

133. See infra Part III.C.
134. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 633 (defining coercion as a “social
mechanism . . . whereby states and institutions influence the behavior of other states by
escalating the benefits of conformity or the costs of nonconformity through material rewards
and punishments”).
135. See Letter from Alan J. Donnelly, Chairman, Delegation for Relations with the U.S.,
European Parliament, to George Bush, Texas governor (June 25, 1998), http://www.eurunion.
org/legislat/DeathPenalty/EPDonBush.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2006) (“Europe is the foremost
foreign investor in Texas. Many companies, under pressure from shareholders and public
opinion to apply ethical business practices, are beginning to consider the possibility of restricting
investment in the U.S. to states that do not apply the death penalty.”).
136. See John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert, Reconciling Extradition with Human
Rights, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 187, 191 (1998) (discussing the European Court of Human Rights’
case Soering v. United Kingdom, which held that a man who was accused of committing murder
in Virginia should not be extradited from the United Kingdom to the United States because of
the possibility that he could receive the death penalty).
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Most other coercive measures regarding the death penalty are
international treaties signed by a number of states, such as the ICCPR
137
and its Second Protocol and the CRC, all of which contain
provisions on capital punishment. The United States has ratified the
ICCPR with a reservation regarding its continued use of the death
penalty,138 but it has not ratified the Second Protocol to the ICCPR or
the CRC. One of the only material benefits that the United States
would receive from ratifying these instruments is that it could then
have the ability to enforce these human rights treaties against other
state parties, and one of the only material costs of not doing so is that
the United States cannot enforce these agreements. These treaties are
not the coercive “‘agreements with teeth’” envisioned by Goodman
139
and Jinks, and are thus relatively weak inducements for the United
States to change its behavior. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
they have had such a result.
Any other coercive measures applied against the United States
regarding the death penalty are likely to meet the same fate as those
measures mentioned above because many of the most effective
coercive measures are economic,140 and the United States is the richest
country in the world. Any effective economically coercive measure is
likely to damage the coercing state as much as, if not more than, the
United States as such action could result in the loss of access to the
United States’ lucrative markets and retaliatory action by the United
States. The power dynamics implicated in coercion are acutely visible
with regard to the United States, making coercion a very unrealistic
method for altering United States human rights behavior.141 Coercion
does not appear to have influenced United States actions regarding
the death penalty in the past and is unlikely to work in the future.
B. The Partial Successes of Persuasion
In recent years Europe, other states, and independent actors
have bombarded the United States with attempts to persuade it to

137. See supra notes 25–31 and accompanying text.
138. See Demleitner, supra note 44, at 141–42 (discussing the United States’ reservations
about the ICCPR).
139. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 691.
140. See id. at 633–34 (using the Foreign Assistance Act, which is a United States statute
providing financial assistance to needy countries who do not violate human rights, as an
example of a coercive measure).
141. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
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142
abolish, or at least narrow, its use of the death penalty. Although
these attempts seem to have made some impact on the United States’
death penalty doctrine, it is unlikely that persuasion is the only
mechanism of state-to-state influence at work. As Goodman and
Jinks set forth, persuasion requires the target state to be consciously
convinced of the correctness of a proposition by the reasoning of the
persuading state, with the assistance of both framing and cuing.143
Although Europe and other states have made a series of efforts to
persuade the United States in this way, the United States’ response to
these efforts does not indicate that it was actually persuaded by them,
despite the fact that the United States has often reached the
persuading states’ desired conclusion. Persuasion has likely played
some role in the development of American death penalty doctrine,
but resistance to acknowledge that role, particularly by the Supreme
Court, indicates that another mechanism of influence, such as
acculturation, is also at work.
Europe’s attempts to persuade the United States to follow in its
footsteps in abolishing the death penalty began with the creation of
the Guidelines to European Union Policy toward Third Countries on
the Death Penalty in 1998,144 which outlined the European Union’s
desire to “work towards universal abolition of the death penalty” and
“[w]here the death penalty still exists, to call for its use to be
progressively restricted and to insist that it be carried out according to
145
minimum standards.” Shortly after this document was issued, the
European Union began submitting a series of statements, letters,
demarches, and amicus briefs to the United States in order to
encourage it to abolish the death penalty, or at least to restrict its
use.146
This strong onslaught of persuasion has had some effect in the
United States. Supreme Court Justices have cited international and in

142. See infra notes 145–46 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 110–13 and accompanying text.
144. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
145. See Guidelines to European Union Policy towards Third Countries on the Death
Penalty, supra note 46, at II.
146. The EU has submitted a number of internal policy demarches that focus on the United
States and its use of the death penalty, and it has written letters to American state and federal
government figures and submitted briefs in United States death penalty cases. Lists of these
documents and links to their full text can be found on the EU website: EU Policy and Action on
the Death Penalty, EUROPEAN UNION IN THE U.S., http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/
DeathPenalty/deathpenhome.htm (last visited Jan. 17, 2005).
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particular European states’ practices in their opinions, acknowledging
the value of these practices as examples of what other states have
147
148
done. Citing the use of international opinions in Trop v. Dulles as
precedent, Justice White referred to international opinion in
149
150
footnotes in Coker v. Georgia and in Enmund v. Florida. Justice
Stevens went so far as to discuss the value of the examples of “other
nations that share our Anglo-American heritage” and “the leading
members of the Western European community” in the text of
Thompson v. Oklahoma.151 Justice Brennan’s dissent in Stanford v.
Kentucky discusses the practices of Western Europe and other
152
countries at some length, and Justice Stevens even cites to an
amicus brief by the European Union in a footnote in Atkins v.
153
Virginia. Most recently, the brief of the European Union and the
role of international opinion were discussed in the oral argument of
Roper v. Simmons,154 and in his majority opinion for the case, Justice
155
Kennedy discusses international and foreign sources extensively.
However, despite the long list of instances in which European
and international persuasive attempts seem to have made a
difference, there is reason to believe that these attempts were not
effective because of their persuasiveness. In other words, although
the United States has followed Europe’s path and even cited to
Europe’s practice and persuasive efforts in doing so, it is possible that
the United States did not do so because it felt “convinced of the truth,
validity, or appropriateness” of European sentiment toward the death

147. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 n.31 (1988) (“We have previously
recognized the relevance of the views of the international community in determining whether a
punishment is cruel and unusual.”).
148. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 102–03 (1958). Although Trop is not a death penalty case, it
did provide precedent for citing international opinion that later influenced such citations in
death penalty cases.
149. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 n.10 (1977).
150. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 796 n.22 (1982).
151. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
152. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 389–90 & nn.9–10 (1989) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
153. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 n.21 (2002).
154. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 13, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) No. 03633 (addressing the role of foreign law in a question by Justice Kennedy: “We’ve seen very
substantial demonstration that world opinion is—is against this, at least as interpreted by the
leaders of the European Union. Does that have a bearing on what’s unusual?”).
155. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575–78 (citing to the CRC, the ICCPR, and other treaties and to
the practices of the United Kingdom and other countries and referring to “the overwhelming
weight of international opinion against the juvenile death penalty”).
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156
penalty. Instead, the United States may have decided to follow
Europe’s path for different reasons.157 This conclusion is supported by
the fact that none of the citations discussed above attribute persuasive
or precedential value to foreign or international practices; these
practices are merely cited as examples.
The conclusion that persuasion may not fully explain the
similarities between Europe and the United States is also supported
by the strong reaction of some Justices on the Supreme Court against
the use of foreign or international law as persuasive precedent.
Justice Scalia commences his series of attacks on the use of foreign
law in decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution in his dissent in
Thompson v. Oklahoma, in which he finds the plurality’s reliance on
the persuasive precedent of foreign practice to be “totally
158
inappropriate.” Justice Scalia’s plurality opinion in Stanford v.
159
Kentucky expresses a similar rejection of foreign practice, as does
160
his dissenting opinion in Roper v. Simmons. Furthermore, Chief
Justice Rehnquist agreed with Justice Scalia’s objections in his Atkins
161
v. Virginia dissent, and Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas
joined in Justice Scalia’s Roper v. Simmons dissent, denouncing the
majority’s use of international and foreign sources.162
Another motivation for considering the possibility that
persuasive attempts were influential for reasons other than their
persuasiveness is the fact that most of the references to foreign law in
the above opinions were relegated to dicta in footnotes, and the fact
the European nations chose a certain path was not a pivotal factor in
the Court’s decision in any of these cases. Furthermore, it can be
argued that the Justices use foreign law to provide justifications for
opinions that they already hold in order to minimize the appearance
of raw judicial activism. If this is the case, the Justices have not been
directly persuaded by foreign law, but instead have formed their
opinions by other means. Thus, it is important to consider what else

156. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 635.
157. See infra Part III.C.
158. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 869 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
159. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n.1 (1989) (asserting that “practices of
other nations . . . cannot serve to establish . . . that the practice is accepted among our people”).
160. Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 324–25 (2002) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
162. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he views of our own citizens are
essentially irrelevant to the Court’s decision today, [but] the views of other countries and the socalled international community take center stage.”).
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besides persuasion may be causing the gradual shift toward the
abolition of the death penalty in the United States.
C. The Strong Influence of Acculturation
When it comes to the death penalty, the United States does not
seem to be susceptible to the coercive influence of the European
Union or other states. Similarly, it does not appear to change its
course solely as a result of the carefully reasoned persuasive
techniques from Europe or elsewhere. Therefore, the high degree of
similarity between the developments in death penalty doctrine
between Europe and the United States must result from another, lessobvious method—the process of acculturation.
As Goldman and Jinks set forth, before acculturation can take
place the target state must be integrated into the appropriate social
environment. In this case the United States most likely already
identifies itself with the group of developed Western democracies,
such as those in Europe, that have abolished the death penalty, and it
probably also identifies with the global social environment that
upholds human rights norms.163 Like the United States, these
countries have democratic systems of government, are at similarly
164
high levels of economic development, and share similar levels of
respect for human rights in areas other than the death penalty.
As the United States is already integrated into the appropriate
social environment, acculturation next requires that European
countries apply the correct combination of cognitive and social
pressures.165 Both categories of pressures can be seen in evaluating the
United States’ movement toward the abolition of the death penalty.
Cognitively, Europe’s actions within the social environment of
democratic, developed, rights-respecting countries create socialpsychological costs to the United States. The fact that the United
States and Europe have a similar degree of respect for human rights
in areas other than the death penalty allows both regions to view

163. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
164. In fact, many of these countries are members alongside the United States in the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the member countries of which are
considered by many to be the most economically developed states. Ratification of the
Convention on the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, http://www.
oecd.org/document/58/0,2340,en_2825_293564_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last visited Feb. 28,
2006).
165. See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
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themselves as nations that respect human rights. The United States
was at the forefront of the movement to create international regimes
166
to increase respect for human rights globally. Respect for human
rights is implicit in the identity and social role of the United States.
The United States sees itself as a country that spreads human rights,
and not one that violates them.
The fact that the United States has not abolished the death
penalty is cognitively dissonant with the rights-respecting identity of
the United States. The increased resolve with which Europe has
attempted to persuade the United States and other countries to
abandon the death penalty creates significant pressure reinforcing this
dissonance. Justice Kennedy acknowledges the cognitive dissonance
caused by the differences in death penalty doctrine between the
United States and other rights-respecting countries in his majority
opinion in Roper v. Simmons.167 The more widespread and vocal the
opposition to capital punishment becomes, the more contradictory
the fact that the United States still uses capital punishment becomes
with its identity as a nation that respects human rights. In order to
resolve this cognitive dissonance, the United States, and in particular
the Supreme Court, has continually restricted its use of the death
penalty.
Europe has also attempted to create social-psychological benefits
for the United States to continue its trajectory along the same path as
Europe in death penalty doctrine. By moving toward abolishing the
death penalty, the United States preserves its membership in the “ingroup” of Western developed democracies that respect human rights.
Again, as objections to capital punishment grow stronger and more
widespread, the death penalty seems more and more contrary to
human rights, and it becomes more and more unlikely that a country
that still uses the death penalty would be revered for respecting
human rights. Dean Harold Hongju Koh states, “I have little doubt

166. See Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st Century, 46
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 294 (2002) (“Since its founding, the United States has promoted
international human rights as a rhetorical cornerstone of its foreign policy.”).
167. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (“[Constitutional] doctrines and guarantees are central to
the American experience and remain essential to our present-day self-definition and national
identity. Not the least of the reasons we honor the Constitution, then, is because we know it to
be our own. It does not lessen our fidelity to the Constitution or our pride in its origins to
acknowledge that the express affirmation of certain fundamental rights by other nations and
peoples simply underscores the centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of
freedom.”).
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that America’s continuation of the practice [of capital punishment]
has undermined our claim to moral leadership in international human
168
rights.” In order for the United States to maintain its status as one
of the world’s leaders in respecting human rights and to continue
fitting in with its social environment of other Western developed
democracies, it must continue to move toward abolition of the death
169
penalty.
Socially, the United States experiences the pressure of shaming
as a result of the frequent statements by Europe on the inhuman
170
nature of the death penalty. In a 2000 memorandum on the death
penalty, the European Union specifically mentions the United States
and its practices regarding the death penalty, stating:
The EU is deeply concerned about the increasing number of
executions in the United States of America (USA), all the more
since the great majority of executions since reinstatement of the
death penalty in 1976 have been carried out in the 1990s.
Furthermore, it is permitted to sentence to death and execute young
offenders aged under 18 at the time of the commission of the crime,
in clear infringement of internationally-recognised human rights
171
norms.

The fact that the European Union singled out the United States’
violations of human rights provides a shaming mechanism pressuring
the United States to move toward abolition. The European Union
also attempts to shame the United States by emphasizing its likeness
172
to countries that are not well known for respecting human rights.
Furthermore, every time Europe attempts to persuade the United
States to abandon its practice of executing individuals in an amicus

168. Koh, supra note 166, at 310 (2002).
169. See supra Part I.B.
170. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
171. EU Memorandum on the Death Penalty (Feb. 25 2000), available at http://www.
eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/eumemorandum.htm. The European Union’s mention of an
increasing number of executions references one of the setbacks in the movement toward
abolition of the death penalty, during which the number of executions rose to a high of ninetyeight in 1999. The number of executions has decreased significantly since the writing of this
memorandum, amounting to only fifty-nine in 2004 and sixty in 2005. Death Penalty Info. Ctr.,
supra note 100, at 1.
172. See Brief for the European Union and Members of the International Community as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent at 8–9, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No.03633) (placing the United States in a class with Iran, Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Yemen, Pakistan, and China as the only countries to execute children since
1990).
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173
the shaming effects of Europe’s
brief, letter, or demarche,
statements on the death penalty are reinforced.
The European Union also provides tentative praise to the United
States when it further restricts its use of the death penalty, providing
a small social benefit for moving toward abolition. After the United
States stopped imposing the death penalty on mentally retarded
individuals in Atkins v. Virginia, the European Union “welcome[d]
174
the decision.” This light pat on the United States’ back indicated
that the European Union would be even more enthusiastic toward the
United States if it eventually decides to completely abolish the death
penalty.
The degree to which acculturation can be expected to influence
American death penalty doctrine also turns on group importance,
exposure, and size.175 Consideration of each of these variables further
supports the argument that acculturation has played a role in the
development of death penalty doctrine in the United States. As to
group importance, the United States’ social environment, composed
of Europe as well as other developed Western democracies, is
certainly important to the United States. Especially since the creation
of the European Union, Europe has become an economic and social
force in the global arena, and the opinions of the EU are influential in
international organizations to which the United States is also a
party.176 As the issue of the death penalty has become more and more
important to Europe, as evidenced by the time and effort spent by the
European Union in combating the use of the death penalty internally
and worldwide,177 it becomes a more important factor to the group as
a whole.
As to exposure, the United States’ closeness to the European
Union, with respect to capital punishment and other issues, is
increasing. In addition to globalization, which allows for increased
exposure due to improved transportation and technology, the
European Union has worked hard to ensure that the United States is

173. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
174. Letter from the European Union to the U.S. Office of the Political Counselor (June 21,
2002), http://www.eurunion.org/legislat/DeathPenalty/DarylAtkinsPrRel.htm (last visited Apr.
11, 2006).
175. See supra notes 123–24 and accompanying text.
176. For example, two of the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council are
members of the E.U. (the United Kingdom and France).
177. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
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178
continuously exposed to its opposition to the death penalty. The
United States would need to be in a vacuum to avoid a high degree of
exposure to its social environment in this area.
As to size, the magnitude of the United States’ social
environment that has abolished the death penalty continues to grow.
Although the growth in the size of the group is only relevant up to a
point,179 the EU and larger groups of Western developed democracies
have certainly reached that point. Therefore, the three final variables
influencing the effectiveness of acculturation are met, reinforcing the
high likelihood that acculturation has been effective in guiding the
death penalty doctrine of the United States down the same path that
Europe has taken.
In the footsteps of European death penalty doctrine
developments, the United States has been constantly exposed to
cognitive and social pressures to similarly alter its death penalty
doctrine by other states that compose its social environment. The
United States Supreme Court’s restriction of the death penalty in
favor of human rights displays a response to these pressures
characteristic of Goodman and Jinks’ mechanism of acculturation.
Although some direct persuasion, and perhaps even coercion, may
have been involved in American death penalty doctrine
developments, the theory of acculturation provides a more complete
understanding of how the United States has responded to changes in
Europe and elsewhere.

CONCLUSION
The path the United States has embarked upon in continuing to
restrict the application of the death penalty is oddly similar to that of
Europe, which only finally abolished the death penalty after many
years of slow reform. The similarities between the United States and
Europe seem too uncanny to be coincidental, but traditional notions
of how states influence one another, coercion and persuasion, do not
seem to explain completely the similarities. The United States is far
too powerful for the kind of cost-benefit calculations that accompany
human rights norms to have serious effects, and the reticence of
Supreme Court Justices to attribute precedential value to foreign and

178. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
179. See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 3, at 642 n.73 (noting that the group size is only
positively correlated with the extent of influence from about three to eight).
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international law in their opinions makes it unlikely that persuasive
efforts have single-handedly convinced the United States to change.
The gap left by the theories of coercion and persuasion is filled
180
by acculturation. Acculturation is a process that operates more
tacitly than coercion and persuasion, explaining similarities between
states by evaluating the internal cognitive and external social
pressures that bear on a group as a result of its social environment.
Acculturation more fully explains the similarities between the United
States and Europe in the development of their respective death
penalty doctrines by illustrating how the United States’ membership
in the group of Western developed democracies that respect human
rights, a group that also includes Europe, causes it to experience
cognitive and social pressures to maintain its identity as a human
rights leader and thus restrict its use of capital punishment.
The United States Supreme Court in particular has demonstrated
the effects of acculturation in its recent decisions restricting the death
penalty under the Eighth Amendment. Although the Justices do not
acknowledge the persuasiveness of foreign precedent, the Court’s
death penalty decisions have almost always followed foreign
precedent. It remains to be seen whether the United States will follow
Europe all the way down the path to abolition, but the effectiveness
that acculturation, alongside some persuasive and coercive measures,
has had thus far on influencing the beliefs and behavior of the United
States indicates that abolitionists can reasonably be hopeful for such a
result.

180.

Id. at 626.

